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RESEARCH ARTICLE
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Copenhagen, Denmark; bResearch Unit for General Practice, NORCE Norwegian Research Centre, Bergen, Norway; cDepartment of
Global Public Health and Primary Care, University of Bergen, Norway
ABSTRACT
Background: Getting the right diagnosis is supposed to provide an explanation of a patient’s
health problem and inform health care decisions. As a core element of clinical reasoning, diag-
nosis deserves systematic and transparent analysis. Conceptual tools can make doctors become
aware of and explore diagnostic knowing.
Methods: We demonstrate diagnostic knowing analysed as interpretative and contextualised
activity. Our analysis is based on Lonergan’s theory of knowing, constituting the cognitive struc-
tures as experiencing, understanding, and judging, in a general practice case.
Findings: Analysis makes the complexity of diagnostic knowing in this context more transpar-
ent, in this case concluding with four diagnostic labels: a corn, constipation, headache and atrial
fibrillation. We demonstrate how a medically significant diagnosis does not necessarily evolve
deductively from complaints. The opening lines from the patient give ideas of where to look for
possible explanations – questions for understanding – rather than diagnostic hypotheses. Such
questions emerge from the GP’s experiences from meeting the patient, including imaginations
and interpretations. When ideas and questions regarding diagnoses have been developed, they
may be judged and subjected to reflection. Questioning may also emerge as transitory concerns,
not extensively ruled out. Lonergan’s theory demonstrated a strong fit with these aspects of
diagnostic knowing in general practice.
Implications: Analysis demonstrated systematic, transparent approaches to diagnostic knowing,
relevant for clinical teaching. We argue that an interpretative understanding of diagnosis can
change clinical practice, complementing hypothetico-deductive strategies by recognising add-
itional substantial diagnostic modes and giving access to scholarly reflection.
KEY POINTS
 Diagnosis is a core element of clinical reasoning, deserving systematic and transparent ana-
lysis beyond hypothetico-deductive reasoning or pattern recognition
 Diagnostic knowing in general practice is a special instance of all human knowing with sub-
jectivity, interpretation and reflexivity as essential elements
 Lonergan’s theory for knowing based on experiencing, understanding, and judging allowed
us to map, decode and recognise advanced acts of clinical reasoning

We share our experiences of how these concepts gave us a tool for systematic analysis of the
complexities taking place in the GP’s office on an ordinary day
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Peter (63), a recently retired teacher, comes to see his regular general practitioner, whom he has consulted for
various health problems the last 14 years. According to the appointment book, Peter’s reason for today’s visit is
constipation. Systematic analysis of the diagnostic challenges unfolding from this point of departure reveals, how-
ever, more complex reasoning than presumed.
Introduction
Getting the right diagnosis is a key task in health care,
supposed to provide an explanation of a patient’s
health problem and inform subsequent decisions and
treatment [1]. The term diagnosis comes from the
Greek word gnosis, meaning knowledge. Diagnosis is
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the act of identifying a disease, illness or problem
by examining someone or something, and also a
statement or conclusion that describes the reason for
a disease, illness or problem [2]. Hence, diagnosis
includes the process of establishing diagnostic know-
ing, as well as its sources and outcomes [3]. Daly calls
attention to methodical ways of analysing the practi-
ces of clinical reasoning, with knowing (diagnosis,
prognosis) and doing (therapeutic decisions) for the
individual patient [4]. Here, we shall explore diagnos-
tic knowing.
Diagnostic knowing is context dependent.
McWhinney argued that although general principles of
medical problem solving are common, each discipline
has its own way of applying them [5]. He demon-
strated how specific clinical strategies have been ela-
borated in primary care, corresponding to the
particular morbidity pattern with undifferentiated con-
ditions, illness presenting in early stages, the continu-
ing doctor–patient relationship and time pressure. As
clinicians and researchers, the authors have previously
explored different aspects of clinical knowledge [6–9].
We understand diagnosis as socially constructed phe-
nomena, surpassing the lists of disease classifications
[3]. In this article, we study diagnostic knowing as cog-
nitive and social action in the general prac-
tice context.
Elstein et al. presented the hypothetico-deductive
model as standard clinical reasoning, where the clin-
ician generates a limited number of hypotheses early
in the workup guiding the subsequent data collection
[10]. In familiar situations, however, experts frequently
base their reasoning on pattern recognition, comparing
and matching the case to a specific instance [11]. We
support previous points of view [6,8,9,12–15] suggest-
ing that diagnostic knowing in general practice
involves cognitive modes beyond these two classical
strategies. Still, the principles of reasoning from com-
plex knowledge sources are poorly understood. As a
core element of clinical reasoning within a knowledge-
based practice, diagnosis deserves systematic, trans-
parent analysis.
For this purpose, appropriate theoretical frameworks
are needed. Leder argues that clinical medicine is not a
purified science but, as a hermeneutical enterprise,
involves interpretation of texts, although well-articulated
interpretation models are rarely seen [16]. Engebretsen
et al. recommend ‘to make explicit the often implicit
interpretational work involved when scientific evidence,
clinical expertise and patient preferences are combined’
[17]. Below, we present theoretical perspectives under-
lying a specific interpretative and reflexive
understanding of diagnostic knowing and demonstrate
its potentials to understand clinical reasoning.
Objective and method
Engebretsen et al. introduced the Canadian theologian
Bernard J. F. Lonergan (1904–1984) [18] in discussions
of evidence-based clinical decision making and uncer-
tainty in emergency medicine [17,19]. Lonergan pre-
sented his theory of knowing as universal for all
domains of insight, dealing with human knowing in
general. The contributions from Engebretsen et al.
inspired us to situate our analysis of diagnostic know-
ing in general practice. We have found Lonergan’s
theory suitable to support analysis of diagnosis con-
ceived as an interpretative activity in this context.
Lonergan understands insight as a human act of
understanding which requires self-awareness and
reflexivity. Analysis of the elements of interpretation
allows the general conditions, functions and outcomes
of the insight to be thoroughly explored and dis-
cussed [18, p.3]. Lonergan’s primary concern is not the
known but the knowing as subjective action (p.12).
Flanagan [20] and Daly [4] summarise Lonergan’s the-
ory of knowing as a dynamically ordered sequence of
three levels of activity, constituting the structure of
cognition: (1) experiencing, (2) understanding, and (3)
judging. Lonergan’s theory also includes a forth elem-
ent (deliberation), which is not always relevant for
diagnostic knowing and therefore not further dis-
cussed here (Figure 1).
Engebretsen et al. elaborate these concepts [19],
suggesting that experiencing is an active process of
prereflexive imagination, that understanding involves
transformation of sensations into ideas, concepts and
questions, while judging is an argumentative act of
weighing the trustworthiness of the understanding.
Flanagan emphasise that the three levels are dynamic-
ally interrelated by the wondering of the knower [20].
Inverse insight is a specific type of knowing [18, pp.
1.   Experiencing 
2.   Understanding 
3.   Judging 
Figure 1. Lonergan’s theory of knowing: a dynamically
ordered sequence of three levels of activity, constituting the
structure of cognition.
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43–50] where the knower realizes that s/he has been
asking the wrong question and that the anticipations
on which the question was based, were mistaken.
Below, we apply Lonergan’s theory and concepts
for analysis of diagnostic knowing on a case from gen-
eral practice selected for this purpose. Our presenta-
tion is a theoretical analysis exploring theory and
concepts for systematic and reflexive analysis of diag-
nostic knowing, not a case study where empirical find-
ings would be highlighted.
The actual case is framed as a consultation in which
the patient Peter sees his GP, Kirsti. The case
embodies exemplary properties of a general practice
consultation (a long-term relationship and a complex
presentation of several complaints within a limited
time). Another exemplary aspect is the GP’s efforts to
prioritise time and energy invested in the different
complaints, whilst concurrently attending to the doc-
tor–patient relationship. For reasons of confidentiality,
we constructed the case assembling medical and
demographic details from several occurrences, arguing
that a general practice consultation with comparable
elements of diagnostic knowing is familiar and fre-
quently occurring.
The case
Our case refers to a consultation in Bergen/Norway,
where the first author (KM) was a GP for decades. The
majority of Norwegians are listed with a GP, tending
to use the same GP for many years (average: 7.7 years)
[21]. The GP holds considerable previous knowledge
about the patient, who may typically present multiple
apparently equally prioritised complaints, some not
very differentiated. Within the frame of the average
consultation time (15minutes), several conclusions are
reached. The patient and the doctor meet again in the
not-so-distant future.
Peter (age 63) sits in the waiting room to see Kirsti,
his regular GP, whilst Kirsti browses his medical
record. Peter is a married, recently retired teacher
who has been on Kirsti’s list for the last 14 years. She
knows him and his previous medical conditions with
prescriptions and follow-ups. From the record, Kirsti
briefly reiterates Peter’s hip arthritis (moderate pain),
hypertension (stable on medication), psoriasis (peri-
odic outbreaks) and oesophageal hernia (increasing
symptoms last year). She also recalls Peter’s usual
demeanour—a positively-minded man with a slightly
long-winded conversational style, with whom she has
always had a good relationship. The appointment list
announces that Peter visits for constipation. Kirsti
reminds herself about potential follow-up needs
related to his chronic conditions. Saying hello to
Peter, she gets a feeling that he looks a little more
distressed than usual.
Peter presents his constipation with a few words.
He says that he goes to the toilet to empty his bow-
els less often than usual, leading to stomach pain.
Before Kirsti gets to expand upon his symptoms, Peter
mentions headache and problems with a toe. Kirsti’s
awareness is fed by a mixture of organising assign-
ments (where to start and how to proceed) and her
perception of Peter (perhaps more concerned than
usual). Several ideas in different directions, not very
manifestly, appear: Are Peter’s current complaints and
appearance associated with his established diseases or
medication? Do any of these symptoms and signs
indicate serious disease, requiring urgent action? Are
all the presented complaints parts of Peter’s agenda
today, or do some of them just represent a casual
chat? How should she organise the consultation?
Which of the complaints require undressing for exam-
ination? What could appropriately be postponed to
later consultations?
Kirsti reviews Peter’s medication - presumably no
drug-associated side effects. A few questions and
answers give her a slight association with early demen-
tia, but her suspicion is rapidly dismissed. She checks
Peter’s toe, he takes off his right sock, and Kirsti
observes a typical corn, easily remedied by self-care or
a podiatrist. She returns to the headache, checking
Peter’s blood pressure, which is normal. He seems
relieved and does not want further investigation. Kirsti
reassures him to return if the headache remains or
gets worse.
Kirsti revisits urgency considering the probability of
constipation as an early sign of cancer in a man aged
63. She asks Peter about his general condition, his eat-
ing habits, how often he goes to the toilet and if he
ever noticed blood in the stool. Belly palpation reveals
nothing special, and Kirsti initiates a small-scale inves-
tigation addressing the malignancy probability with
blood and stool tests. She closes today’s attention to
this part of the case and trusts that she will be
reminded of the constipation issue when the test
results appear.
During the dialogue about Peter’s general condi-
tion, he casually mentions that a friend recently died.
Since then, he has not made his daily walks. This com-
ment draws Kirsti’s attention to his mood - is he
depressed? After probing with a few words, she
understands she is on the wrong track. Peter’s talk-
ativeness and distress, however, indicate to Kirsti that
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something indispensable might be embedded in men-
tioning the walks. Kirsti asks more specifically, and
Peter tells about periods of weakness, sometimes
accompanied by a jumpy heart. Kirsti feels some relief
when this last piece of information materialises, and
the indication of cardiac arrhythmia comes distinctly
to her. Periodic atrial fibrillation is now confirmed by
palpation of Peter’s pulse, auscultation of his heart
sounds and, conclusively—the same day, at the prac-
tice laboratory—by a typical ECG pattern.
Peter leaves Kirsti’s consultation room 13minutes
after arrival. Several diagnostic ideas have been float-
ing around in the consultation room and in the GP’s
mind. Peter’s medical record for that day contains four
diagnostic labels: a corn (which he himself will han-
dle), constipation (low-key investigation initiated),
headache (normal blood pressure) and atrial fibrillation
(appointment next week to plan management). No
mental illness has been pursued or confirmed. The
dialogue was tranquil and reciprocal. Peter’s previous
medication has been briefly reviewed and is not
changed. Although some of the diagnostic paths have
been straightforward, the medically most significant
one, cardiac arrhythmia, was not.
Analysis of diagnostic knowing, applying
Lonergan’s theory and concepts to the case
Now, we shall apply Lonergan’s theory and concepts
and demonstrate how these offer access to analysis of
diagnostic knowing exemplified by the consultation
presented above. Diagnosis starts with (1) the prere-
flexive experiences and imaginations of the GP related
to the patient’s presentations. The GP transforms
experiences and imagination into (2) questions for
understanding. Eventually, (3) reflection judges the
trustworthiness of diagnostic hunches or ideas, or they
are just recognised without further probing.
First, Kirsti’s imaginations are activated with the
experiences evoked by multiple sources of information.
Over the years she has incorporated Peter’s image as
a person, sensing that today he appears a little more
distressed than usual. His appearance makes her more
attentive to his mood. Peter presents verbal informa-
tion about his bowel movements, headache, not going
for walks anymore and several other issues. Kirsti
checks his toe and notices the skin changes, adding
these perceptions to her experiences applied for diag-
nostic knowing.
Then the experiences create images and interpreta-
tions, contributing to questions for understanding, such
as whether Peter’s chronic conditions or medications
are associated with his symptoms. Questioning may
emerge as a transitory concern, not extensively ruled
out, for example concerning Peter’s headache and
mental state. Another example of how interpretations
create questions is whether the constipation indicates
cancer. Such questions for understanding activate a
more determined awareness and interpretation of the
complaints, involving for example the duration of the
problems and which of the problems that deserve elab-
oration. Questions for understanding may trigger new
questions adding to or replacing the understanding,
such as the information that Peter gave up his walks
because of weakness and palpitations.
Finally, when ideas and questions regarding diagno-
ses have been developed, they may be (but are not
always) judged and subjected to reflection. The idea
that Peter’s appearance might indicate early dementia
is swiftly reflected upon and abandoned, without any
formal judgment. But the surprisingly emerging hunch
of cardiac disease leads to specific questions probing
for a specific diagnosis or class of diagnoses, with the
recognition of irregular pulse confirmed and specified
by a pathognomonic ECG. Judging and reflecting upon
the questions leads to the conclusive judgment that
Peter suffers from episodes of atrial fibrillation. But a
diagnosis of cardiac disease was considered initially nei-
ther by the patient nor the GP. Expanding upon diag-
nosis of the bowel problems, on the other hand,
remains provisional by the end of the consultation, as
some questions for understanding are still unanswered.
Since these questions are attributed potential danger,
the GP will follow up in due time. The diagnosis of the
corn deserves no further exploration by questioning or
judgment, and the headache is judged as insignificant
based on insights drawn from questioning and examin-
ation of the blood pressure. The pattern of this consult-
ation, illustrated by concurrent exploration of several
different and potentially interacting complaints, demon-
strates typical challenges in general practice. Diagnostic
knowing is a dynamic and sometimes circular process,
in which the different threads are not necessarily
brought to a completed cycle of cognition.
Inverse insight occurs when Kirsti asks Peter about his
general condition. His response is specific, including the
information that he no longer makes his walks. Kirsti
suddenly realises that the question she had probably
asked herself – is this maybe because Peter mourns his
friend and is depressed? – was faulty and contributed to
a wrong track. This insight sharpened her attention for
other imaginations, from which she understands that
walks make Peter tired and his heart jumpy. After brief
probing, a possible mood disorder was dismissed, and
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new questions may evolve. Kirsti considers a cardiac dis-
order which – although potentially serious – is quite eas-
ily investigated and diagnosed. Until the brief passage
about walks, the flow of information in the consultation
offered no indication of heart disease.
Discussion
Lonergan staged his theory as a universal understand-
ing of insight, with interpretative action as the integral
element of knowing. Above, we have presented a the-
oretical analysis of a typical case of diagnostic know-
ing, demonstrating how Lonergan’s theory may
support a systematic and transparent recognition of
interpretative actions conducted by the GP, informed
from multiple sources. Below, we discuss the strengths
and limitations of such an approach to analysis of
diagnostic knowing.
What is known from before, and what does our
analysis add?
We are not the first to address diagnostic knowing,
neither in general [10,22,23] nor in the general prac-
tice context [5,13]. Interpretation has also previously
been highlighted as a clinical skill [16], emphasizing
for example the general practice interaction and per-
ception of cues [24]. Applying Lonergan’s theory and
concepts for analysis of diagnostic knowing in general
practice, our presentation complements the pursuits
of Engebretsen et al. [19], contributing to make med-
ical knowing accessible for analysis and reflection.
Formulation of questions and choice of adequate
strategies for the pursuit of the relevant evidence for
the particular case are significant dimensions of clin-
ical knowing [14], aligning with the original under-
standing of evidence based medicine (EBM) [25]. The
particularity of diagnostic knowing that we reveal, is
however, incompatible with the basic idea of general-
izability of sources for knowing and standardisation of
evidence in contemporary EBM [26]. Understanding
diagnostic work as hypothesis testing implies that a
limited number of hypotheses are established early in
the diagnostic process, guiding data collection, whilst
pattern recognition infers immediate categorisation of
new cases comparingwith previous instances or
abstract prototypes [11]. Our case includes indeed
both these modes – pattern recognition demonstrated
by the GP’s categorisation of Peter’s toe problem as a
corn, and hypothesis testing considering cardiac dis-
ease with confirmation of atrial fibrillation. The latter
path, leading to the atrial fibrillation diagnosis through
hypothesis testing, also demonstrates experiencing,
understanding, and judging, Understanding how the
doctor arrived at this hunch can, however, only be
recognised through a lense of inverse insight.
Our mission is not to translate processes such as
hypothetico-deductive reasoning into a new language.
We want to demonstrate how Lonergan’s perspectives
offer access to complex cognitive processes of diag-
nostic knowing, where the inevitable subjectivity of
interpretation is acknowledged without dismissing
scholarly rigour. Interpretation is an integrated, posi-
tive aspect of diagnosing that can be fostered and
developed [18], not only a subjective bias in cognition
[11]. Interpretive action is needed to create hypothe-
ses for deduction as well as questions for
understanding.
The case highlights how a medically significant
diagnosis (atrial fibrillation) may evolve otherwise than
a deductive consequence of complaints primarily pre-
sented by the patient. Analysis shows how diagnostic
knowing initiated by interpretation of multiple subtle
presentations is elaborated towards different aspects
and levels of knowing. The opening lines from the
patient function as ideas of where to look for possible
explanations of the patient’s complaints rather than
diagnostic hypotheses. In Lonergan’s terms, such ideas
serve as ‘questions for understanding’, for example
‘Could this complaint represent side effects of the
patient’s medications?’, or ‘Are the presented prob-
lems associated with the patient’s recent retirement?’
The patient’s distress draws the GP’s attention to parts
of the story associated neither with the patient’s rea-
sons for the encounter nor his presented complaints.
Distress does not, however, work as a hypothesis but
rather as an unspecific sensation of something wrong.
Questioning the distress is done before the doctor
pursues and arrives at a specific diagnosis. The
patient’s complaint, constipation, is not ignored but
pursued towards adequate levels of understanding.
Our analysis exposes how different processes of diag-
nostic knowing are entangled and can still be
reflected upon.
Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes based on
practical rules of thumb and different from analytics
[15], but this concept does not adequately cover the
cognitive phenomena of diagnostic knowing we have
described. Daly argues that understanding is distinct
from intuition in processes of learning from experience
[4]. Gut feelings have also been proposed as the third
track of GPs’ clinical reasoning, being a particular type
of intuitive feelings, usually confined to prognostic
assessments of the patient’s situation and often
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accompanied by bodily sensations in the doctor [27].
Neither does this concept match the different aspects
of diagnostic knowing that we have portrayed above,
especially not the obligation of interpretation com-
bined with reflection. On the other hand, Lonergan’s
concepts offer specific access to unpack the contents
of the ‘black box’ of gut feelings.
Lonergan’s theory reveals diagnostic knowing with
adequate insight achieved also at levels of under-
standing less advanced than formal judgment. The
relevance of the questions determines the adequate
level and value of a diagnostic conclusion. Lonergan’s
theory embraces insight about multiple problems pre-
senting at the same time, a typical diagnostic chal-
lenge for the GP. Furthermore, our analysis
demonstrated how situations involving several com-
plaints, diseases and medications encompass appropri-
ate trade-offs between problems deserving urgent and
extensive attention versus problems that more easily
reach a resolution or can wait.
Resistance towards shifting from one hypothesis to
another is one of the persistent problems of clinical
reasoning [11]. In our case, the GP rapidly dismisses
the idea that Peter is depressed and, during the talks
about walks, suddenly gets the inverse insight that
she pursued the wrong question. Recognising this
made it possible for her to shift attention and
approach an awareness for a possible heart disease.
Lonergan argues that inverse insight does not occur
often [18, pp 43–50]. Trusting our experiences from
clinical practice, however, we suggest this phenom-
enon to be an important and frequently occurring
aspect of diagnostic knowing, deserving more atten-
tion. A reflective approach, including a capacity for
judgment of one’s own insights, can make it easier for
the GP to abandon a stray idea and admit that s/he is
‘barking up the wrong tree’ [14,19].
The context of general practice
Engebretsen et al. were the first to apply Lonergan’s
perspectives to medicine, discussing decision making
in the contexts of respectively evidence-based medi-
cine, trauma team and physiotherapy [17,19,28]. Later,
Daly presented an oncological case [4]. These contri-
butions encouraged us with a strong impact on our
approach, while we also noticed that these situations
involve diagnostic challenges very different from those
in general practice. Supported by Lonergan’s theory,
we therefore set out to explore the preconception
that diagnosis in general practice is a special instance
of the structure of all human knowing. Still, we do not
expect Lonergan to cover all relevant features for a
specific setting. Although our analysis demonstrated a
capacity to include a broad range of issues with a spe-
cial impact for the GP, such as time, organisation, doc-
tor–patient relationship and the complex pattern of
morbidity, we noticed that certain unique aspects of
diagnostic knowing are not fully covered by Lonergan.
Time is a diagnostic asset for GPs encountering
patients’ complaints and diseases in all stages of their
natural history [5,29]. Some health problems are self-
limiting and disappear within a short time, whereas
others will evolve from vague sensations towards dis-
tinct patterns of symptoms and disease, and still
others will remain medically unexplained, although
the burden of suffering is substantial [9,30]. In general
practice, diagnostic knowing often comprises a specific
approach: to wait and see if a symptom develops as
significant [13,31]. It also entails the possibility that
the GP revisits and interprets initial experiences of the
patient’s problems differently. In our case, analysis
demonstrates how time is utilised when the GP plans
the follow-up. She tolerates a provisional level of
insight and uncertainty with Peters headache, as she
will soon see the patient again, and a completed cycle
of cognition is neither relevant nor necessary.
The organisation of general practice also has an
impact on diagnostic knowing. The GP finishes the
consultation within a limited number of minutes, and
the possibilities of referral for further investigation
vary depending on geography and the services
required. In our case, the GP’s laboratory offers an
important temporary diagnostic insight determining
the need for further investigation. Anaemia or faecal
blood would indicate urgent colonoscopy, whereas
the absence of such pathology offers a time span to
observe the course of illness. In this way, the organisa-
tion frames diagnostic knowing to settle with locally
available tests, using progress over time to estimate
the need for further evaluation.
The doctor–patient relationship is a specific feature
of general practice, often developed over years, tran-
scending individual episodes of illness [5]. Continuity
of care furnishes diagnostic knowing with presenta-
tions from experiences inviting to interpretation and
judgment. The GP can see the patient again to solve
more problems, thus establishing diagnostic knowing
consecutively by integrating new insights.
Furthermore, observation over time may clear the way
for knowing when the situation is not urgent. In our
case, the GPs prior knowledge of the patient included
an overview of his medical history, enhanced the
exchange of knowledge, and sensitised the GP’s
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awareness for changes in the patient’s demeanour
and capacity. We realise that such preconceptions,
representing vital sources of information for diagnostic
knowing, are not easily grasped with Lonergan’s con-
cepts. Values (those of the GP, the patient, the family,
and the culture) are also involved in the diagnostic
approaches and in subsequent goals and actions
when the long-term relationship may transcend facts
and logic.
The morbidity pattern in general practice contains
many unsorted problems and complaints. The pre-
sented problem often lacks a clear-cut answer [31],
and diagnostic knowing does not always lead to a
diagnosis with the capacity to explain or cure illness.
As demonstrated in our analysis, multimorbidity repre-
sents particular challenges, with symptoms from differ-
ent diseases mixing, merging and staging in aberrant
formats, often at the same time [32]. The GP must con-
sider which information is noise or conversation, and
what really matters for the patient’s health. Reflecting
upon questions for understanding whilst assessing and
prioritising which of them deserve further attention for
understanding and judgment, supports the process of
sorting out. Simultaneous management of multiple
problems requires skilful diagnostic knowing. We have
shown how Lonergan’s theory and concepts make it
possible for us to decode and recognise different ele-
ments of the cognitive sequences where prior judg-
ments call forth new insights, verifications, value
judgments and decisions. In this way, we have tried to
contribute to make the process more accessible for
reflection and learning.
Theory for enhanced understanding of practice
The clinical encounter is constitutive of general prac-
tice, and the specific knowing generated in this
encounter deserves status as evidence [14]. Daly
argues that ‘methodical attention to the structured
sequence of cognitive and deliberate operations is
itself a potential resource both in clinical practice and
in coordinating the development and implementation
of diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic tools’ [4].
Regarding diagnostic knowing as interpretation
embedded in subjectivity, we commit ourselves to
reflexivity towards this specific mode of knowing,
rather than trusting an algorithm. Presenting our ana-
lysis of the case, we have demonstrated how
Lonergan’s theory and concepts helped us organize
our analysis of diagnostic knowing and discuss the
impact of this. For GPs, knowing your own knowing is
essential for the appropriate and trustworthy act of
reasoning. Reflexivity is therefore a crucial diagnostic
skill for GPs, offering an opportunity for alternative
interpretations, new questions for understanding and,
sometimes, inverse insight [7,14]. In this way, system-
atic analysis may reveal the content and meaning of
clinical knowing and acknowledge the potential for
sharing and critical discussion [14].
Strengths and limitations of our approach
The case that we established for analysis embodies
exemplary elements of diagnostic knowing in general
practice. The core elements of this case with the
patient, his complaints, and diseases, as well as the
course of the consultation are recognisable for a
broad range of GPs across nations, cultures, and
health care systems. The GP we portrayed was an
experienced practitioner, and the doctor–patient rela-
tionship has been longstanding. We do not know
whether a less experienced GP would have perceived
all the diagnostic clues presented here and interpreted
them similarly. Nevertheless, these qualities support
the claim that our analysis and findings bear a strong
potential for transferability. On the other hand, our
presentation is also intended as an interpretative con-
tribution. A qualitative study with participant observa-
tion would give access to elements beyond those
presented here.
Implications for clinical and academic practice
Our analysis sustains the idea that conceptual tools
can enhance doctors’ awareness, thinking explicitly
about what they are doing when diagnosing. We
found Lonergan’s theory especially useful to under-
stand diagnostic knowing in the complexity of general
practice. Still, several aspects of the theory as well as
our analysis, may be transferable to other medical
contexts. Our analysis demonstrates promising cap-
acity for transparent and reflexive approaches to diag-
nostic knowing, with a strong potential for clinical
teaching and further theoretical reflections. Our ana-
lysis encourages us to argue that an interpretative
understanding of diagnosis will complement hypothet-
ico-deductive strategies by recognition of substantial
diagnostic modes, thereby changing clinical practice
by giving access to scholarly reflection and teaching.
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ments or comparable ethical standards. Since the art-
icle does not contain studies with actual human
participants, informed consent and approval from The
Regional Committees for Research Ethics was
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